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Impact of Prior Knowledge and Data Correlation on
Privacy Leakage: A Unified Analysis
Yanan Li, Xuebin Ren, Shusen Yang, and Xinyu Yang
Abstract—It has been widely understood that differential
privacy (DP) can guarantee rigorous privacy against adver-
saries with arbitrary prior knowledge. However, recent studies
demonstrate that this may not be true for correlated data, and
indicate that three factors could influence privacy leakage: the
data correlation pattern, prior knowledge of adversaries, and
sensitivity of the query function. This poses a fundamental
problem: what is the mathematical relationship between the
three factors and privacy leakage? In this paper, we present
a unified analysis of this problem. A new privacy definition,
named prior differential privacy (PDP), is proposed to evaluate
privacy leakage considering the exact prior knowledge possessed
by the adversary. We use two models, the weighted hierarchical
graph (WHG) and the multivariate Gaussian model to analyze
discrete and continuous data, respectively. We demonstrate that
positive, negative, and hybrid correlations have distinct impacts
on privacy leakage. Considering general correlations, a closed-
form expression of privacy leakage is derived for continuous data,
and a chain rule is presented for discrete data. Our results are
valid for general linear queries, including count, sum, mean, and
histogram. Numerical experiments are presented to verify our
theoretical analysis.
Index Terms—privacy leakage, correlated data, prior knowl-
edge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Leakage of private information could lead to serious con-
sequences (e.g., financial security and personal safety), and
privacy protection has been extensively studied for several
decades [1, 2]. In today’s big data era, privacy issues have
been attracting increasing attention from both society and
academia [3–6]. Differential privacy (DP) [7–9] has become
the defacto standard for privacy definitions because it can
provide a rigorously mathematical proof of privacy guarantees.
This work is supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation of
China under Grants 61572398, 61772410, 61802298 and U1811461; the Fun-
damental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant xjj2018237;
China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant 2017M623177; the China
1000 Young Talents Program; and the Young Talent Support Plan of Xi’an
Jiaotong University. (corresponding author: Shusen Yang).
Y. Li is with National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Analytics (NEL-
BDA), Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, China, and also with
the School of Mathematics and Statistics, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an,
Shaanxi 710049, China (e-mail: gogll2@stu.xjtu.edu.cn).
X. Ren, and X. Yang are with the School of Electronic and Information
Engineering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, China, and
also with National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Analytics (NEL-
BDA), Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, China, (e-mails:
{xuebinren, yxyphd}@mail.xjtu.edu.cn).
S. Yang is with National Engineering Laboratory for Big Data Analytics
(NEL-BDA), Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi 710049, China, and
also with the Ministry of Education Key Lab for Intelligent Networks and
Network Security (MOE KLINNS Lab), Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an,
Shaanxi 710049, China (e-mail: shusenyang@mail.xjtu.edu.cn).
Public 
Knowledge
1
2
3
0 0
? 1
1 1
s2
Observation
CorrelationPrior knowledge
Inference
s1=?
r=f(s1,s2)+noise
Database
Noisy statistics
s1 s2 s3
s4 s5
Pr(s1,s2)
s2s1
Fig. 1. Illustration of Example 1: an adversary attempts to infer the
information of s1 based on the joint distribution of database x, the published
result r, and his prior knowledge about s2.
In practice, adversaries may be able to acquire prior knowl-
edge (i.e., partial data records), due to database attacks [10],
privacy incidents [11], and obligations to release [12]. It is
commonly believed that differentially private algorithms are
invulnerable to adversaries with arbitrary prior knowledge
because any given privacy level can be guaranteed, even when
the adversary has knowledge of all data records except certain
ones (i.e., the adversary with the strongest prior knowledge).
However, this is true only if all data records are independent.
It has been shown that the adversary’s prior knowledge can
have significant impacts on privacy leakage when data records
are correlated [13, 14].
The following example demonstrates how privacy leakage
can be affected by correlations and the adversaries’ prior
knowledge.
Example 1 Fig. 1 shows a scenario in which an ad-
versary attempts to infer some sensitive information about
a database. As shown, the database x consisting of two
attributes, s1 ∈ {0, 1}, and s2 ∈ {0, 1}, publishes noisy
(via a Laplace mechanism of differential privacy) statistics for
privacy-preserving data mining. The adversary may acquire
some prior knowledge about the database, i.e., the exact
value of s1 and the data correlations Pr(s1, s2) from some
public knowledge (e.g., the Internet). After observing the noisy
statistics r = f(s1, s2) + noise, the adversary tries to infer
the privacy of s1 based on all available information. Assume
a noisy statistic r = s1+s2+noise = 2, the prior knowledge
s2 = 1, and the adversary’s first impression about s1 is
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Fig. 2. Illustration of Example 1: the inference results of two adversaries; the weak adversary knows nothing about s2, the strong adversary knows s2 = 1.
Considering five correlations of s1 and s2, when the correlation is a perfectly positive correlation or perfectly negative correlation and independent, adversaries
infer different information from the output result r = 2. The problem is how to analyze the general impacts of the correlation and prior knowledge on privacy
leakage.
Pr(s1 = 1) = Pr(s1 = 0) = 0.5 before inference. The
privacy information gain obtained by the adversary in the
inference process is summarized in Fig. 2. We use the following
three special cases to show the impacts of the correlations and
prior knowledge on privacy leakage.
1) Case 1 (Positive Correlation): s1 and s2 are perfectly
positively correlated with coefficient 1, i.e., s1 = s2.
Without prior knowledge, the adversary will infer s1 +
s2 = 2 from the observation with high confidence ac-
cording to the characteristics of the Laplace mechanism.
Combined with the correlation s1 = s2, he will infer
s1 = 1 with high confidence. With the prior knowledge,
e.g., s2 = 1, the adversary can ascertain that s1 = 1
from the correlation s1 = s2.
2) Case 2 (Negative Correlation): s1 and s2 are perfectly
negatively correlated with coefficient −1, i.e., s1+s2 =
1. Without prior knowledge, the adversary can infer no
additional information about s1 through r = 2 due to the
negative correlation. However, with the prior knowledge
s2 = 1, the adversary can claim that s1 = 0. In addition,
r = 2 provides no additional information.
3) Case 3 (No Correlation): s1 and s2 are independent.
Without prior knowledge, the adversary can infer that
s1 = 1 with relatively higher probability than s1 = 0
from the observation r = 2. However, with the additional
prior knowledge of s2 = 1, the adversary obtains no
more confidence about s1 because there is no correlation
between s1 and s2, i.e., a stronger adversary with extra
prior knowledge achieves no privacy gain compared
with a weaker adversary.
The above special correlation cases show that an adversary
with certain prior knowledge can obtain different privacy
gains under different types of correlations. For general cor-
relation cases, i.e., when correlations are weakly positive or
weakly negative (cases with red backgrounds in Fig. 2), the
adversary can also infer additional information through the
published results. Meanwhile, when correlations are perfectly
positive or negative, adversaries with different prior knowl-
edge can also gain different privacy information.
As demonstrated in the above examples, prior knowledge
can be utilized by adversaries to infer sensitive informa-
tion, leading to serious threats to various privacy preserving
scenarios, such as data publishing [15–18], continuous data
release [19–22], location based services [23–25], and social
networks [26, 27]. To achieve efficient privacy protection for
correlated data, it is essential to conduct rigorous theoretical
studies to understand the analytical relationship between prior
knowledge and privacy leakage, which is the main goal of this
paper.
There have been several research efforts to this fundamental
problem. The sequential composition theorem [7] of DP states
that correlated data causes linear incrementing of privacy leak-
age if simply treating the correlated data as a whole. However,
this does not utilize the correlation sufficiently and leads to
a low utility for weakly correlated data. Therefore, many
works [16, 19, 25, 28, 29] have focused on exploiting cor-
relations to achieve high utility without sacrificing the privacy
guarantee. However, these works do not consider adversaries
with different prior knowledge, which has significant impacts
on privacy leakage. Specifically, it has been demonstrated
that without assumption on the adversaries’ prior knowledge,
no privacy guarantee can be achieved [13, 30]. To measure
the impacts of prior knowledge, Pufferfish privacy [12] and
Blowfish privacy [31] formally model prior knowledge in
their mathematical privacy definitions. However, there are
no analytical impacts of correlation and prior knowledge on
privacy leakage provided in either work [12, 31].
The state-of-the-art research, Bayesian differential privacy
(BDP) [32], explicitly describes the relationship of privacy
leakage and prior knowledge for a special case, i.e., when
data are positively correlated. However, different types of
correlations mean that the maximal influence of the query
result caused by one tuple, i.e., the sensitivity, is different,
and thus, leading to different privacy leakage. Therefore,
it is necessary to discuss privacy leakage under all types
of correlations, ranging from −1 to 1 (including negative,
independent, and positive correlations). As BDP is based on a
3Laplacian matrix that can only model the positive correlations
for sum queries, the analytical method and conclusions in
[32] cannot be generalized to negative correlations or hybrid
correlations (i.e., positive and negative coexist).
In summary, the analytical relationship between prior
knowledge and privacy leakage under general correlations
remains unclear. To address this problem, this paper presents
the first unified analysis that considers positive, negative, and
hybrid data correlations. Our contributions are as follows:
1) We propose the definition of prior differential privacy
(PDP) to measure privacy leakage caused by an adver-
sary with any prior knowledge under general correla-
tions. Based on PDP, we present a unified formulation
(Theorem 2) to measure and discuss (Theorem 3) the
impact of privacy leakage under varied prior knowledge
and data correlations. Both the formulation and discus-
sion can help us better understand the impact of prior
knowledge and data correlation on privacy leakage.
2) We analyze privacy leakage for both discrete and con-
tinuous data. For discrete data, we propose a graph
model to present the structure of the adversaries’ prior
knowledge, and a chain rule (Theorem 5) to compute
the privacy leakage. For continuous data, instead of a
Markov random field, we adopt the multivariate Gaus-
sian model to present general data correlations and
derive a closed-form expression to compute privacy
leakage (Theorem 6). Our analytic method is based on
the theory of Bayesian inference. The analytical results
can guide us in designing more efficient mechanisms
with better utility-privacy tradeoffs.
3) We demonstrate that the analytic results can be applied
to general linear queries, including count, sum, mean,
and histogram. Extensive numerical simulation results
verify our theoretical analysis.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related work. Section III introduces the
notations and presents some preliminary knowledge. In section
IV, a new definition PDP is proposed to analyze the impacts
of prior knowledge, and we illustrate that three factors can
impact privacy leakage. Section V and Section VI present
the theoretical analysis of privacy leakage for both discrete
data and continuous data, respectively. Numerical experiments
are presented in Section VII, and we conclude this paper in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Data Correlation
Many studies [13, 25, 28, 29] have demonstrated that
DP may not guarantee its expected privacy when data are
correlated. There are two plausible solutions to protecting
the privacy of correlated data records. One is to achieve DP
on each data record independently. However, the composition
theorem [7] of DP has demonstrated that the privacy guarantee
degrades with the number of correlated records. Another is to
take the data records as a whole [27, 33, 34]. However, when
the number of records is large, or the correlation is weak, the
utility will still be low.
Therefore, it is crucial to accurately measure the data
correlations to achieve more efficient privacy protection. Con-
siderable work has been done from different perspectives. For
general correlations, some work replaces the global sensitivity
with new correlation-based parameters, such as correlated
sensitivity [35] and correlated degree [36]. For example, in
[35], a correlation coefficient matrix was utilized to describe
the correlation of a series, and the correlation coefficient
was considered as the weight to compute the global sensi-
tivity. By utilizing inter- and intra-coupling, [36] proposed
behavior functions to model the degree of correlation. For
temporal correlations, most of the research work has focused
on saving the privacy budget consumption in time-series data
[19, 22, 24, 37]. For example, Dwork [37] proposed a cascade
buffer counter algorithm to adaptively update the output result
on an {0, 1} data stream. Fan [19] adopted a PID controller-
based sampling strategy to adaptively inject Laplace noise into
time-series data to improve the utility. For spatial correlations,
the main idea is to group and perturb the statistics over
correlated regions to avoid noise overdose [23, 38]. As a
typical example, Wang [23] proposed dynamically grouping
the sparse regions with similar trends and adding the same
noise to reduce errors. In addition, for attribute correlations
in multiattribute datasets, the fundamental idea is to reduce
the dimensionality via identifying the attribute correlations
[39, 40]. For example, Zhang et al. [39] constructed a Bayesian
network to model the attribute correlation in high-dimensional
data and then synthesized a privacy-preserving dataset in an ad
hoc way. However, all these works assumed that adversaries
have fixed prior knowledge, and thus, may not achieve the
optimal tradeoff against adversaries with prior knowledge. In
this paper, we consider both data correlations and flexible prior
knowledge.
B. Prior Knowledge
Prior knowledge can influence privacy leakage when the
data are correlated [28, 32, 41], which has been considered in
different research in terms of privacy definition and the design
of privacy-preserving mechanisms. For example, the Pufferfish
framework [12], aiming to help domain experts customize
privacy definitions, theoretically has the potential to include
all kinds of adversaries. The subsequent work of Blowfish
privacy [31] developed mechanisms that permit more utility by
specifying secrets about individuals and constraints about the
data. In [42], a Wasserstein mechanism was proposed to fulfill
the Pufferfish framework. In addition, [41] studied privacy
leakage caused by the weakest adversary, and proposed the
identity differential privacy (IDP) model. [43] exploited the
structural characteristics of databases and the prior knowledge
of domain experts to improve utility. However, no theoretical
analysis on the relationship between the prior knowledge and
privacy leakage has been formulated in all these work. In
some research [44, 45], privacy leakage was guaranteed by
limiting the difference between prior knowledge and posterior
knowledge. However, in these works, the adversaries’ prior
knowledge was limited to the probability distribution of the
database and did not consider that partial data records may
4TABLE I
NOTATIONS AND MEANINGS
notations descriptions
x A database instance {x1, x2, . . . , xn}.
U ,K The indices set of unknown/known tuples.
xU ,xK The instances of unknown/known tuples.
s, sK, sU The sum of instance x, xK and xU .
xi, x
′
i
Two different values of tuple i.
x−i The database x with xi eliminated.
x
′ The database x with xi replaced with x
′
i.
Ai,K An adversary with prior knowledge xK to attack xi.
lAi,K The privacy leakage caused by the adversary Ai,K.
r ∈ R The random request generated by M.
M A randomized mechanism over x.
θ ∈ Θ All possible distributions of x.
LSi(f) The local sensitivity of a query function on tuple i.
GS(f) The global sensitivity of a query function on x.
be compromised by specific adversaries. Instead, [28, 32]
separated the adversary’s specific prior knowledge of partial
tuples from the public knowledge of data correlations, which
are derived from data distributions. Based on that, Yang et
al. [32] adopted a Gaussian correlation model to study the
impact of prior knowledge and demonstrated that the weakest
adversary could cause the highest privacy leakage. Similar
conclusions can be found in [28], which further identifies
the maximally correlated group of data tuples to improve
the utility. Nonetheless, the limitation is that their Laplacian
matrix based Markov random field model can only be applied
to analyze positive correlations on sum queries for continuous
data or binary discrete data.
In this paper, we formally derive a formulation to present a
unified analysis of the impact of data correlation and prior
knowledge on privacy leakage, considering general linear
queries on both discrete and continuous data.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We describe notations and conceptions in Subsection III-A,
and introduce some knowledge of DP that will be used in our
analysis in Subsection III-B.
A. Notations
A database with n tuples (attributes in a table or nodes in
a graph), denoted as the set of indices [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n},
aims to release the result of a certain query function s = f(x)
on an instance of the database, x = {x1, x2, · · · , xn}. It
should be noted that, in accordance with [28, 29, 32], we
use the same term “tuple” to denote the attribute instead of
the record in a database. To protect the privacy of all tuples
of an instance, it will return the noisy answer r =M(f(x))
by adding random noise drawn from a distribution. Hence,
all possible outputs S constitute a probability distribution
Pr(M(f(x)) ∈ S), or equivalently a conditional distribution
Pr(r ∈ S|f(x) = s). We use a set Θ to capture the adversary’s
beliefs on data correlation. We do not guarantee the privacy
against adversaries out of Θ, because there is no feasibility
under arbitrary distributions [11]. The main notations are listed
in Table I.
1) Adversary and Prior Knowledge: We denote Ai,K as
an adversary who attempts to infer the information of tuple
xi, under the assumption that he knows the values of xK.
We call xi the attack object, xK is the prior knowledge,
K ⊆ [n] \ {i}, where [n] = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Let U denotes the
indices set of unknown tuples, then [n] = K ∪ {i} ∪ U and
the dataset x = {xK, xi,xU}. An adversary Ai,K is called
the strongest adversary when K = [n] \ {i} and is called the
weakest adversary when K = ∅. Ai,K′ is called an ancestor
of Ai,K if K′ is a subset of K and differs by only one tuple,
i.e., K′ = K\{j}. More tuples in xK mean the adversary has
stronger prior knowledge.
2) Correlation: To measure data correlations, we adopt the
Pearson correlation coefficient, which can identify linear corre-
lations. More importantly, it can be used to distinguish positive
correlations and negative correlations. In joint distribution θ,
let ρij,K denote the correlation coefficient of xi and xj under
the condition xK. In this paper, ρij,K plays an important role
in the analysis of how prior knowledge affects privacy leakage.
3) Linear Query: A linear query function can be repre-
sented as f(x) =
∑
i aixi, where xi, xj ∈ x are correlated
with the Pearson correlation coefficient ρij . The linear query
function can be transformed into a sum query f(y) =
∑
i yi
on a new database y by letting aixi as yi, where yi ∈ y.
Then, the correlation coefficient of yi and yj should be
ρ′ij = sign(aiaj)ρij . Combining our new privacy definition
PDP (will be discussed in Subsection IV-A), models can deal
with general correlations; therefore, we focus our analysis on
the sum query without loss of generality, and the conclusion
can be straightforwardly extended to general linear queries.
B. Differential Privacy
Definition 1. (Differential Privacy [9]). A randomized mech-
anism M satisfies ε-differential privacy (ε-DP), if for any
S ⊆ Range{M}, the differential value xi, x′i
DP (M) = sup
i,x−i,xi,x′i,S,
log
Pr(r ∈ S|xi,x−i)
Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,x−i)
≤ ε. (1)
Here, ε > 0 is the distinguishable bound of all outputs on
neighboring datasets x and x′, where x′ is the database x
with xi replaced with x
′
i. A larger ε corresponds to easier
distinguishability of xi and x
′
i, which means more privacy
leakage.
For numerical data, a Laplace mechanism [9] can be used to
achieve ε-DP, by adding carefully calibrated noise to the query
results. In particular, we draw noise from Laplace distribution
Lap(λ) with the probability density function
p(z) =
1
2λ
exp(−|z|/λ),
in which λ = GS(f)/ε. Here, GS(f) = supx,x′ ‖f(x) −
f(x′)‖1 is the global sensitivity of query f(·), and LSi(f) =
supx′ ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1 is the local sensitivity of f . Since r =
f(x) + z, the probability density function of the output can
be represented as
p(r|x) = 1
2λ
exp(−|r − f(x)|/λ).
5IV. PRIOR DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
To compute the privacy leakage when considering adver-
saries with different prior knowledge and databases with
different joint distributions, we propose a new definition in
Subsection IV-A. Furthermore, we illustrate that three factors
can affect privacy leakage through three numerical examples
in Subsection IV-B.
A. Prior Differential Privacy
To evaluate privacy leakage considering adversaries have
different prior knowledge, the definition BDP is proposed in
[32] based on the Bayesian inference method [11, 14, 46].
However, BDP can only be applied to positive correlations.
To overcome the drawback, we propose a definition named
Prior Differential Privacy (PDP), which can be applied to
databases with general correlations.
Definition 2. (Prior Differential Privacy) Let x be a database
instance with n tuples, Ai,K is an adversary with the attack
object xi and prior knowledge xK,K ⊆ [n] \ {i}. The joint
distribution of x is denoted as θ, θ ∈ Θ, where Θ is a set of
distributions.M = Pr(r ∈ S|x) is a randomized perturbation
mechanism, and S is the output space. The privacy leakage
of M w.r.t Ai,K is the maximum logarithm function for all
different values xi, x
′
i, and any output r ∈ S.
lAi,K(θ) = sup
xi,x′i,r
log
Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK)
Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,xK)
. (2)
We say M satisfies ε-PDP if Eq. (2) holds for any i ∈ [n],
K ⊆ [n]\{i}, θ ∈ Θ. That is,
sup
i,K,θ
lAi,K(θ) ≤ ε.
In Definition 2, lAi,K(θ,M) is the privacy leakage caused
by the adversary Ai,K under the distribution θ, which rep-
resents the data correlation. ε is the maximal privacy leakage
caused by all adversaries with public distributionΘ. Compared
with BDP that only considers a single distribution, PDP con-
siders a set of distributions Θ. Thus, PDP is more reasonable
because the set Θ can reflect the cognitive diversity of the
aggregator and the adversaries.
We show that PDP is in accordance with the Bayesian
inference, Eq. (2) can be written as
sup
xi,x′i,r
(
log
Pr(xi|r,xK)
Pr(x′i|r,xK)
− log Pr(xi|xK)
Pr(x′i|xK)
)
. (3)
Eq. (3) denotes the information gain achieved by the adversary
Ai,K, after the adversary observes the published results r.
In addition, the PDP bounds the maximal information gain
inferred by all possible adversaries that are no larger than ε.
The next theorem shows that prior knowledge impacts privacy
leakage only when the database is correlated.
Theorem 1. Prior knowledge has no impact on privacy
leakage when tuples in the database are mutually independent.
Proof. For an adversary Ai,K and its ancestor Ai,K′ ,K′ =
K\{j}, we get
Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK′) =
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′) Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK)
=
∑
xj
Pr(xj) Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK).
The last equality holds when the data tuples are inde-
pendent, i.e., Pr(xj |xi,xK′) = Pr(xj). And similarly,
Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,xK′) =
∑
xj
Pr(xj) Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,xK). If
lAi,K(θ,M) ≤ ε, according to PDP, we have Pr(r∈S|xi,xK)Pr(r∈S|x′
i
,xK)
∈
[e−ε, eε]. Multiplying this fraction by Pr(xj) and summing
with respect to xj , we obtain lAi,K′ (θ,M) ≤ ε on the basis
of the definition PDP. Therefore, different prior knowledge K
and K′ have the same privacy leakage.
Theorem 1 is also consistent with Eq. (3). If tuples are
independent, then xK can be omitted in Eq. (3). Therefore,
the prior knowledge has no impact on the privacy leakage
when tuples are independent.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that DP and PDP are also
consistent in nature. They all reflect the maximal distinguisha-
bility between distributions of perturbed output calculated on
two neighboring datasets. In this paper, neighboring datasets
are obtained by modifying one record in the dataset. The
difference in DP and PDP is the different forms of neighboring
datasets. In DP, the neighboring datasets are {xi,x−i} and
{x′i,x−i}. However, in PDP, the neighboring datasets are
{xi,xK} and {x′i,xK}. For any given θ and xK, we have
Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK)
Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,xK)
=
∑
xU
Pr(xU |xi,xK) Pr(r|xi,x−i)∑
xU
Pr(xU |x′i,xK) Pr(r|x′i,x−i)
≤ sup
xU ,x′U
Pr(r|xi,xU ,xK)
Pr(r|x′i,x′U ,xK)
= sup
xi∪U ,x′i∪U
Pr(r|xi∪U ,xK)
Pr(r|x′i∪U ,xK)
.
(4)
The last equality in Eq. (4) applies DP on datasets differing at
most |U|+1 tuples. The inequality in Eq. (4) holds for the fact
that
∑
i aici∑
i
bidi
≤ maxi,j cidj , if all parameters are nonnegative and
{ai} and {bi} are probability simplex. Taking the logarithm
and supremum of Eq. (4) over r, we obtain lAi,K(θ,M) ≤
DP (M). Therefore, DP provides an upper bound of privacy
leakage for PDP, i.e., we achieve a better trade-off between
privacy and utility by adopting PDP than adopting DP.
B. Influence Factors
In this section, we demonstrate that three factors, prior
knowledge xK, joint distribution θ, and local sensitivity
LSi(f), impact privacy leakage through numerical Example
2 to Example 4.
As shown in Table II, there are four joint distributions of
database x = {x1, x2}. The first three distributions have the
same domain x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1} with different correlations, the
third and fourth distributions have the same correlation, but x2
has a different domain. Considering a sum query f(x) = x1+
x2, set Laplace mechanism scale λ = 1 for simplicity. Denote
6TABLE II
FOUR JOINT DISTRIBUTIONS
(a) Positive correlation
x1=0 x1=1
x2=0 0.3 0.2
x2=1 0.2 0.3
(b) Negative correlation
x1=0 x1=1
x2=0 0.2 0.3
x2=1 0.3 0.2
(c) Perfect correlation
x1=0 x1=1
x2=0 0.5 0
x2=1 0 0.5
(d) Perfect correlation
x1=0 x1=1
x2=0 0.5 0
x2=5 0 0.5
lA1,K(a) as the privacy leakage caused by the adversary A1,K
when the distribution of x is Table II(a).
Example 2 (Prior Knowledge). Two adversaries A1,{2} and
A1,∅, attempt to infer the information x1 = 0 or x1 = 1.
A1,{2} knows the information of x2 (e.g., x2 = 1), and A1,∅
knows nothing about x2. Based on the definition of PDP, we
calculate lA1,{2}(a) and lA1,∅(a). For A1,{2} and x2 = 1, we
get
lA1,{2}(a) = sup
r
log
Pr(r|x1 = 0, x2 = 1)
Pr(r|x1 = 1, x2 = 1)
= sup
r
log
exp(−|r − 1|)
exp(−|r − 2|) = 1.
When A1,∅ knows nothing about x2, according to Eq. (2), we
have
lA1,∅(a) = sup
r
log
Pr(r|x1 = 0)
Pr(r|x1 = 1)
= sup
r
log
∑
x2
Pr(x2|x1 = 0) exp(−|r − (0 + x2)|)∑
x2
Pr(x2|x1 = 1) exp(−|r − (1 + x2)|
≈ 1.19.
The exponential entries are derived from the Laplace mecha-
nism and given x1, x2. Similarly, lA1,∅(b) ≈ 0.82. Therefore,
lA1,∅(a) > lA1,{2}(a), (5)
lA1,∅(b) < lA1,{2}(b). (6)
Example 2 shows that prior knowledge has significant in-
fluence when the correlations are different. More importantly,
it answers the two problems extended from Example 1. In
addition, we note that the privacy leakage of DP is 2 if we
simply regard correlated tuples x1, x2 as a whole. Therefore,
we achieve stricter privacy protection than DP under the same
noise mechanism. In other words, we can introduce less noise
to obtain the same privacy level.
Example 3 (Correlation). An adversary A1,∅ attempts to
infer the information of x1 with no prior knowledge about
x2. To show the impacts of the correlations, we modify
0.3 → 0.49, 0.2 → 0.01 in Tables II(a) and II(b) to obtain
two distributions (a’) and (b’), in which x1 and x2 have
stronger correlation. Computations of lA1,∅(a
′) and lA1,∅(b
′)
are similar to lA1,∅(a) in Example 2. According to Eq. (2), we
obtain lA1,{2}(a
′) = 1.95, lA1,{2}(b
′) = 0.05. Therefore,
lA1,∅(a
′) > lA1,∅(a), (7)
lA1,∅(b
′) < lA1,∅(b). (8)
Example 3 demonstrates that different correlations have
significant influences on privacy leakage. Particularly, Eq. (7)
shows that the adversary can infer more information of x1
through a stronger positive correlation, and Eq. (8) shows the
opposite result when the correlation is negative.
Example 4 (Local Sensitivity). An adversary A1,∅, with no
prior knowledge of x2, attempts to infer x1. The difference in
distributions Tables II(c) and II(d) is the domain of x2. Based
on PDP and the similarity of computations of lA1,∅(a) in
Example 2, we have lA1,∅(c) = 2, and lA1,∅(d) = 6. Therefore,
lA1,∅(c) < lA1,∅(d).
For the sum query on x, the local sensitivity of xi is its
own domain. In distribution Table II(c), LS2(f)/LS1(f) = 1.
In distribution Table II(d), LS2(f)/LS1(f) = 5. Example 4
shows that the local sensitivity impacts privacy leakage and a
larger sensitivity ratio can lead to higher privacy leakage.
Examples 2-4 demonstrate that three factors impact privacy
leakage, and show how to compute the privacy leakage for a
database composed of two tuples. In the following sections,
we will extend the numerical results to analytical results for
both discrete and continuous data.
V. GENERAL RELATIONSHIP ANALYSIS AND PRIVACY
LEAKAGE COMPUTATION FOR DISCRETE DATA
In this section, we analyze privacy leakage with respect
to the three factors when data are discrete. Subsection V-A
presents a weighted hierarchical graph (WHG) to model all
adversaries with various prior knowledge. Subsection V-B
discusses how to calculate the weight of edges in the WHG.
Subsection V-C formulates a chain rule to represent the privacy
leakage for an adversary with arbitrary prior knowledge.
Subsection V-D presents a full-space-searching algorithm to
compute the privacy leakage, and a fast-searching algorithm
to improve the search efficiency in practice.
A. Weighted Hierarchical Graph
A hierarchical graph is used to represent adversaries with
various prior knowledge. Each node (i,K) denotes an adver-
sary, in which tuple i is the attack object, and tuples set K
denotes the prior knowledge. For a database with n tuples,
there are n layers in a graph. From the bottom to the top,
the prior knowledge K decreases by one tuple for each layer,
until K = ∅. To compute the privacy leakage of adversaries,
we further construct a weighted hierarchical graph (WHG)
by assigning weights for the edges in the graph. We first
define the value of nodes as the privacy leakage caused by
corresponding adversaries. In addition, the edge connecting
two nodes denotes the privacy leakage difference between two
adversaries with the neighboring prior knowledge sets, i.e.,
|K| − |K′| = 1. Then, the process of analyzing the privacy
leakage is as follows. First, we construct the hierarchical graph
for all possible adversaries for a given database. Second, we
compute the values of all edges in the graph to obtain the
WHG (discussed in Subsection V-B). Third, we compute the
values of nodes in the first layer by PDP. Finally, we can
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Fig. 3. An example to show the three tuples WHG. Each node (i,K) denotes
an adversary who attempts to infer the tuple i with prior knowledge K. There
are three levels composed of nodes with the same prior knowledge size. A
directed edge connects the node and its ancestor from the lower layer to higher
layer. Therefore, we obtain a directed graph to present all possible adversaries.
obtain all nodes’ values by proposing a chain rule (Theorem
5). Finally, the privacy leakage can be obtained by choosing
the maximal node naturally.
For example, we can obtain a WHG consisting of three
layers and twelve nodes for a simple database with three
tuples, as shown in Fig 3. Based on the node (2, {1, 3}) and
edges e23,1 and e21,3, we obtain the privacy leakage for nodes
(2, {1}) and (2, {3}). Similarly, we can obtain the other four
nodes in the second layer. For the node (2, ∅), we compute
two values based on (2, {1}), e21,∅ and (2, {3}), e23,∅, and
choose the minimum as its privacy leakage. Similarly, we
obtain another two nodes in the third layer. Now, the privacy
leakage is the maximal node value in the graph.
In the above process, one key problem is to compute the
edge value. Therefore, we propose a formula to address the
problem.
B. Impacts of Correlations and Prior Knowledge
In this section, we mainly deduce the formula to compute
the edge value, which represents the impact of privacy leakage
caused by different prior knowledge. Meanwhile, we show that
the edge value is closely related to data correlation.
Note that the edge value shows the gain of privacy leakage
when one tuple is removed from the prior knowledge. If the
edge value is positive, then the ancestor, a weaker adversary,
can cause more privacy leakage. If the edge value is negative,
then the ancestor, a stronger adversary, can cause more privacy
leakage.
Given x′K, Pr(xi, xj |K′) denotes the conditional distribu-
tion derived from the joint distribution θ, and ρij,K′ is the
corresponding conditional correlation coefficient. The domain
of tuple xi is {xi,1, xi,2, · · · , xi,s}, in which s is the domain
size of xi. Based on Pr(xi, xj |K′), the impact of xi on xj ,
under two different values xi,1, xi,2 of xi, can be denoted as
ICj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) = log
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,1,xK′)e−xj/λ∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,2,xK′)e−xj/λ . (9)
Then, impacts of xi on xj , under all possible pairs xi,m, xi,n,
can be denoted as a set
Γij,K′ = {ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n)|∀xi,m, xi,n ∈ domxi,m < n}.
(10)
Next, a theorem shows how to compute the edge value.
Theorem 2. Assume the privacy leakage of an adversary Ai,K
is lAi,K , then the privacy leakage of its ancestor Ai,K′(K′ =
K\{j}) is
lAi,K′ = |lAi,K + ICij,K′ |, (11)
where
ICij,K′ = argmax
γ∈Γij,K′
|lAi,K + γ|
is the value of the edge connecting two nodes (i,K) and (i,K′)
in the WHG.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 2 shows the impact on privacy leakage ICij,K′
caused by two adversaries whose prior knowledge differs by
one tuple under general correlation. According to Theorem
2, the value ICij,K′ is the element in the set Γij,K′ that
maximizes the privacy leakage of node (i,K′). That is, ICij,K′
presents the maximal impact of xi on xj under the conditional
distribution Pr(xi, xj |xK).
To show the relationship between ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) and
the three factors described in Subsection IV-B, we rewrite the
ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) as
ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) = IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) · LSj(f)
λ
, (12)
where
IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) = ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n)/(LSj(f)/λ) (13)
is called the increment ratio to denote the impact caused
by correlations. ICj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) represents the variation of
privacy leakage when prior knowledge decreases. Therefore,
the two components IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) and LSj(f)/λ in
Eq. (12) represent the impact of local sensitivity, and corre-
lation, respectively.
Now, we give the relationship between IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n)
and conditional correlation coefficient ρij,K′ .
Theorem 3. (1) For a database x with all possible joint
distributions, IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) ∈ [−1, 1]. (2) Under the
assumption that the domain size of xi and xj are two, then
IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) has the following relationship with ρij,K′:
1) if ρij,K′ > 0, then IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈ (0, 1];
2) if ρij,K′ = 0, then IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) = 0;
3) if ρij,K′ < 0, then IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈ [−1, 0).
(3) Under the assumption that the domain size of xi is two, the
domain size of xj is greater than two, meanwhile, λ > GS(f),
and then the results in Case (2) still applies.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Case (1) in Theorem 3 shows that IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) has
the same bound as the correlation coefficient. Case (2) shows
that the relationship between the edge value and the data
correlations, and extends the results of Examples 2-4 to general
cases. Case (3) shows that similar results hold for a general
xj with a larger domain, as long as λ > GS(f). Since the
privacy budget ε = GS(f)/λ in DP is commonly set as ε < 1,
8the condition λ > GS(f) is usually true. Theorem 3 shows
the impacts of the correlations and prior knowledge on the
privacy leakage of the aggregation of two correlated tuples,
which correspond to the different cases in Fig. 2.
Combining Theorem 3 with Eq. (11) and Eq. (12), we note
that the weaker adversary causes higher privacy leakage when
the tuples are positively correlated because more unknown
tuples with positive correlations means a greater sensitivity to
the query result. However, when tuples are negatively corre-
lated, the weaker adversary does not cause less privacy leakage
because more unknown tuples with negative correlations does
not always mean smaller sensitivity or less privacy leakage.
What about when the domain size of xi is greater than
two? Do the results in Theorem 3 still hold? Regretfully, the
answer is negative. Let the domain size of xi be s, then the
number of IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) is
(
s
2
)
. We cannot guarantee all
these IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) satisfy Theorem 3. Instead, we have
the following analytical results.
1) If ρij,K′ > 0, at least one IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) ∈ (0, 1];
2) if xi and xj are independent, all IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) = 0;
3) if ρij,K′ < 0, at least one IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) ∈ [−1, 0).
Therefore, combining the above analytical results with
Eqs. (12) and (11), we also conclude that the weaker adversary
can cause higher privacy leakage when xi and xj are positively
correlated. The prior knowledge has no impact on privacy leak-
age when xi and xj are independent, which also corresponds
to Theorem 1. However, we cannot derive a deterministic
relationship between the privacy leakage and prior knowledge
if the tuples are negatively correlated. In this situation, we
have to use Eq. (11) to determine their relationship.
C. Privacy Leakage Formulation
In this subsection, we introduce how to compute the node
value, which represents the privacy leakage caused by the
adversary with prior knowledge in the WHG. As mentioned
in Subsection V-A, the computation relies on two steps. One
step computes the node values in the first layer; the other is a
chain rule. We first present how to compute the node values
in the first layer.
Theorem 4. For a database x which has n tuples and follows
the joint distribution θ, the values of the nodes in the first layer
are lAi,[n]\{i} = LSi(f)/λ, i ∈ [n], where LSi(f) is the local
sensitivity, and λ is the parameter in the Laplace mechanism.
Proof. Based on the definition of PDP, ∀i ∈ [n], we have
lAi,[n]\{i} = sup
r,xi,x′i
log
Pr(r|xi,x−i)
Pr(r|x′i,x−i)
= sup
r,xi,x′i
log
exp(−|r − f(x)|/λ)
exp(−|r − f(x′)|/λ)
≤ sup
xi,x′i
|f(x) − f(x′)|/λ = LSi(f)/λ.
Theorem 4 demonstrates that the joint distribution, which
represents the correlation, has no impact on privacy leakage
when the adversary has the strongest prior knowledge. On
the basis of Theorem 4, we deduce the values of the nodes
in the second layer through Theorem 2. Similarly, we can
obtain the values of the nodes in layer k + 1 by layer k
according to Theorem 2. Finally, we can obtain all nodes’
values. In particular, the following theorem presents a solution
to computing the privacy leakage of a certain node in WHG.
Theorem 5. (Chain Rule) For a node (i,K) in the layer k+
1, there exists a path from the bottom node [n] to the node
(i,K),K = [n]\{i, j1, · · · , jk}. From layer 1 to layer k +
1, (i, [n]\{i}), (i, [n]\{i, j1}), · · · , (i, [n]\{i, j1, · · · , jk}) are
all the nodes in the path. Then, the privacy leakage of the
node (i,K) corresponding to this path is
lAi,K =| . . . ||LSi(f)/λ+ ICij1,[n]\{i,j1}|+ ICij2,[n]\{i,j1,j2}|
+ · · ·+ ICijk,[n]\{i,j1,··· ,jk}|,
(14)
where | . . . || denotes k-fold absolute value operation, and k
is the length of the path.
Proof. The result can be obtained by using Theorem 2. In a
path from the bottom to the top, there are k + 1 nodes and
k edges, each of which consists of two nodes in the adjacent
layers. The chain rule can be obtained by applying Theorem
2 on all k edges in a path.
Theorem 5 shows the computational process for a path from
the bottom node to the given node. If there exist multiple paths,
we should compute the value of each path by using Eq. (14),
and then choose the minimum as the node’s value. There are
three factors that can impact privacy leakage. The length of
the path in Eq. (14), which represents the amount of prior
knowledge. To highlight the other two factors, according to
Eq. (12), we rewrite Eq. (14) as follows
lAi,K =
∣∣∣∣. . .
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣LSi(f)GS(f) + IRij1,[n]\{i,j1}
LSj1(f)
GS(f)
∣∣∣∣
+ · · ·+ IRijk,[n]\{i,j1,··· ,jk}
LSjk(f)
GS(f)
∣∣∣∣ GS(f)λ .
(15)
According to Eq. (15), we can see that PDP is superior
to group differential privacy in terms of calculating an ac-
curate privacy leakage for the adversary with specific prior
knowledge. Particularly, according to Theorem 3, we have
IRij,K ∈ [−1, 1], ∀K ⊆ [n]\{i}. By setting all IRij,K = 1
in Eq. (15), we have
lAi,K ≤
∑
j∈{i,j1,··· ,jk}
LSj(f)/λ (16)
≤ (k + 1)GS(f)/λ. (17)
Eqs. (16) and (17) show that the privacy leakage under PDP is
more accurate than group differential privacy, which is simply
derived from the sequential composition theorem. In addition,
when the edge values in the WHG are all greater or less than
zero, we can deduce some special results in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1. 1) When all ICij,K = 1, the PDP degrades
to group differential privacy.
92) When all ICij,K > 0, the maximal privacy leakage is
obtained at the top layer, i.e., the weakest adversary
causes the highest privacy leakage.
3) When all ICij,K < 0, the maximal privacy leakage is
obtained in the bottom layer, i.e., the strongest adversary
causes the highest privacy leakage.
Case 1) can be derived from Eq. (16) directly. Additionally,
it is easy to prove Cases 2) and 3) by using Eq. (15) and
summing the nodes’ values in layer order.
Based on Corollary 1, we can easily compute the privacy
leakage for these special cases. For example, in Case 2), the
privacy leakage increases with the layer number. However,
in general cases, when WHG has both positive and negative
edges, we have to traverse the whole WHG to compute the
privacy leakage.
D. Algorithms for Computing Privacy Leakage
For a given database x with n tuples, the number of edges
is no fewer than the number of nodes n2n−1. Therefore, it is
intractable to traverse the WHG when the number of tuples
is large. We first use the full-space-searching algorithm to
compute the least upper bound of privacy leakage and then
propose a heuristic fast-searching algorithm to reduce the
calculation time by limiting the searching space.
In the full-space-searching algorithm, we first initialize the
value of the nodes in the first layer by Theorem 4 (line 1).
Then, we generate nodes in layer k+1 by using the chain rule
(Theorem 14) based on the edges’ value (Eq. (11)) between
layers k and k+1 (lines 3-10). Note that for a given node in
layer k + 1, there may exist multiple paths from the nodes in
layer k to the given node. As mentioned previously, we need
to retain the minimal value computed from multiple paths as
the node value (line 8). Finally, we obtain the maximal privacy
leakage of all nodes in the WHG (line 11).
Algorithm 1 Full-Space-Searching
Input: Database {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, joint distribution θ
Output: Privacy Leakage l
1: Generate nodes (i, [n]\{i}) in the first layer, set
lAi,[n]\{i} = LSi(f)/λ and l1 = GS(f)/λ;
2: Denote all nodes in the first layer as N1;
3: for k=2 to n do
4: for each node (i,K) ∈ Nk−1 do
5: Generate node (i,K′) by subtracting {j} from K;
6: Compute lAi,K′ = |lAi,K + ICij,K′ |;
7: end for
8: Detect the repeated nodes with the same attack tuple
and prior knowledge in layer k; only retain the node with
the minimal privacy leakage;
9: return lk = max(i,K′)∈Nk{lAi,K′ };
10: end for
11: return l = maxk∈[n]{lk};
Proposition 1. The time complexity of the full-space-
searching algorithm is O(n42n−1).
Proof. There are two steps to obtain the value of the nodes in
the layer k+1 from the value of the nodes in the layer k. One
is to first obtain new nodes in layer k + 1 by removing one
tuple from the prior knowledge of the nodes in layer k. The
second step is to sort and remove the repeated nodes with the
same attack tuple and prior knowledge in layer k + 1. There
are n
(
n−1
n−k
)
nodes in layer k, so the number of nodes after the
first step would be n
(
n−1
n−k
)
(n − k), denoted as tk. The time
complexity after the second step is Θ(tk log tk). We note that∑n−1
k=1 tk ≤ n22n−1. Summing from k = 1 to n− 1, the time
complexity of the algorithm is
n−1∑
k=1
(tk + tk log tk) ≤
n−1∑
k=1
tk +
n−1∑
k=1
tk
n−1∑
k=1
log tk
≤ n22n−1(1 + 2n2) ≤ 3n42n−1.
(18)
As we can see, considerable time will be required to
generate new nodes and to remove repeating nodes in the full-
space searching algorithm. In addition, the time complexity
grows exponentially with the number of tuples n. To reduce
the computational time complexity, a fast-searching algorithm
is proposed to search a subspace of the original full space with
a little sacrifice of the accuracy. Specifically, we only use the
top n largest nodes in layer k to generate layer k + 1.
Proposition 2. The time complexity of the fast-searching
algorithm is O(n4).
Proof. According to the fast-searching algorithm, there are, at
most, n tuples in layer k. After the subtraction operation, there
are at most n(n − k) tuples, denoted as tk. The rest of this
proof is the same as that of proposition 1.
Algorithm 2 Fast-Searching
Input: Database {x1, x2, · · · , xn}, joint distribution θ
Output: Privacy Leakage l
1: Initialize nodes in layer 1;
2: for k=2 to n do
3: Generate the nodes in layer k;
4: Detect the repeated nodes and retain the minimum
node;
5: Retain the top min{n,#(Nk−1)} largest nodes;
6: return lk;
7: end for
8: return l = maxk∈[n]{lk};
VI. GAUSSIAN MODEL-BASED ANALYSIS FOR
CONTINUOUS DATA
In this section, we further discuss the impacts of correla-
tion and prior knowledge for the continuous-valued data. In
Subsection VI-A, we first explain why the WHG is not suit-
able for the continuous-valued database. Then, we introduce
some properties of the multivariate Gaussian distribution. In
Subsection VI-B, we identify an explicit formula to compute
the privacy leakage of the multivariate Gaussian model.
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A. Multivariate Gaussian Model
The necessity to separate the continuous situation from
the discrete situation is that the computation method used
in Section V is no longer sustainable. In Section V, we
investigate how correlation and prior knowledge can impact
privacy leakage. Based on the proposed WHG, we deduce the
chain rule to compute privacy leakage. One crucial step is
to compute the edge value in the WHG. Discrete-valued data
can be achieved by using Eqs. (9) and (11), which requires
enumerating all the different pairs of value xi,m and xi,n in
the domain. Obviously, it is impossible for continuous-valued
tuples with an unbounded domain. To deal with this issue, we
should clarify the joint distribution. Therefore, although the
analytical results in Section V still holds for both continuous-
valued data; the edges’ value cannot be directly computed as
discrete data.
For continuous data, a common solution is to accurately
identify the global sensitivity via bounding the range (i.e.,
domain) of the tuples [12, 32]. Otherwise, the privacy leak-
age would be overestimated, and the unboundedness would
destroy the utility of privacy-preserving results. Therefore, by
bounding the range of xi as |xi−x′i| ≤M, r, Eq. (2) becomes
lAi,K(θ) = sup
|xi−x′i|≤M,r
log
Pr(r ∈ S|xi,xK)
Pr(r ∈ S|x′i,xK)
. (19)
Different from the sum operation in computing probability in
Section V, we use integrate to compute the probability for
continuous data. That is
Pr(r|xi,xK) =
∫
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK) Pr(r|xj , xi,xK)dx.
Here, we choose the multivariate Gaussian distribution
(denoted as MGD) to describe the database x since most of the
continuous data can be well modeled by MGD. For a database
x with n tuples, x = {x1, · · · , xn}, µ is the expectation
vector, and Σ = (ρij)n×n is the covariance matrix. If ρij > 0,
xi and xj are positively correlated. If ρij < 0, xi and xj are
negatively correlated. If ρij = 0, xi and xj are independent.
x follows the MGD if the density function of x is
f(x) = (2pi)−
n
2 |Σ|− 12 exp
(
−1
2
(x− µ)′Σ−1(x− µ)
)
,
and denote x ∼ Nn(µ,Σ). If x is blocked as {x1,x2}, then
µ,Σ can be written as
µ = [µ1,µ2]
′,Σ =
[
Σ11 Σ12
Σ21 Σ22
]
The following lemma shows the properties of the MGD.
Lemma 1. [47] Given the n-dimensional variable x =
{x1,x2} follows the multivariate Gaussian distribution
Nn(µ,Σ), x1 ∈ Rp,x2 ∈ Rn−p.
1) The distribution of x1 given x2 follows
the p-dimensional Gaussian distribution
Np(µ1|2,Σ1|2),Σ22 ≻ 0, with
µ1|2 = µ1 +Σ12Σ
−1
22 (x2 − µ2), (20)
Σ1|2 = Σ11 −Σ12Σ−122 Σ21. (21)
2) For any nonzero vector a ∈ Rn,
a⊤x ∼ N1(a⊤µ, a⊤Σa). (22)
B. Privacy Leakage Computation
As we can see from Eq. (19), the key to computing privacy
leakage is computing the conditional probability when x fol-
lows the MGD. Let x2 = {xi,xK}, x1 = x\{xi,xK} = xU ,
we have
Pr(r|xi,xK) = Pr(r|x2) =
∫
x1
Pr(x1|x2)Pr(r|x)dx1,
in which Pr(x1|x2) can be obtained by Lemma 1, and Pr(r|x)
can be calculated according to the Laplace mechanism. In
addition, according to Eq. (19), when the attack object xi is
replaced with x′i, we have to compute
Pr(r|x′i,xK) =
∫
x1
Pr(x1|x′2)Pr(r|x′)dx1, (23)
where x′2 = {x′i,xK}, x′ = {x′i,xK,xU}.
However, it is difficult to directly calculate the above
probability formula under the assumption that |xi − x′i| ≤M
for all possible pairs of xi, and x
′
i. Fortunately, the next lemma
shows that we can combine the Pr(x1|x′2)Pr(r|x′) into a
uniform expression, which is useful for computation.
Lemma 2. [32] Let G(x; b) be a function on x ∈ R, with
parameter b > 0,
G(x; b) = ex
(
1− Φ(x
b
+ b)
)
+ e−xΦ(
x
b
− b), (24)
where Φ(x) is the cumulative distribution function of a stan-
dard Gaussian distribution. Then,
∂ logG(x;b)
∂x is monotonically
decreasing with respect to x and
lim
x→−∞
∂ logG(x; b)
∂x
= 1; lim
x→+∞
∂ logG(x; b)
∂x
= −1.
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we propose the next formula to
compute the privacy leakage of an adversary (i,K) directly.
Theorem 6. Given x follows the multivariate Gaussian dis-
tribution Nn(µ,Σ), f(x) =
∑
i∈[n] xi is a general sum query
on x. LetM be Laplace mechanism with the perturbed output
r = M(x) = f(x) + z, where z ∼ Lap(λ). Given an
adversary Ai,K with θ ∈ Θ and |xi − x′i| ≤ M , then the
privacy leakage can be represented as
lAi,K(θ) =
M
λ
|1 + µ0i| . (25)
where µ0i is the coefficient of xi in the expansion of µ0 in
Eq. (37).
Proof. See Appendix C.
Theorem 6 shows the impacts of the correlation and prior
knowledge on privacy leakage for continuous data under the
multivariate Gaussian distribution. For the given M and λ, we
can see that the privacy leakage is determined by µ0i, which
is related to the covariance matrix Σ and prior knowledge K.
µ0i is the coefficient of xi in µ0, which can be obtained from
Eqs. (20) and (22). The details can be found in the proof of
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Theorem 6 (Appendix C). In the analysis of discrete-valued
data without a concrete expression of the data distribution,
the chain rule is proposed to compute the privacy leakage.
However, for continuous data, based on the assumption of the
MGD, we can compute the privacy leakage of an adversary
directly without considering every two adjacent adversaries.
For a special case that considers the weakest adversary, the
privacy leakage has the following explicit form.
Corollary 2. For an n-dimensional Gaussian distribution
Nn(µ,Σ),Σ = (ρij)n×n, the privacy leakage of the weakest
adversary is lAi,φ = |1 + ρ−1ii
∑
j 6=i ρij |M/λ, i ∈ [n].
Proof. In such case, the x2 = {xi}, and x1 = x−i. According
to Lemma 1, µ1|2 = (µ1, · · · , µi−1, µi+1, · · · , µn)⊤+ (ρi1 +
· · ·+ρi,j−1, ρi,j+1, · · · , ρin)⊤ ·ρ−1ii ·(xi−µi). By the definition
of µ0, we have
µ0 = 1
⊤
µ1|2 =
∑
j 6=i
µj − µi
∑
j 6=i
ρij + xiρ
−1
ii
∑
j 6=i
ρij .
Here, µ0i, the coefficient of xi in µ0, is ρ
−1
ii
∑
j 6=i ρij . Then,
we complete the proof by applying Theorem 6.
The proof of Corollary 2 demonstrates a special case of
how to compute the coefficient µ0i for the weakest adversary
in Eq. (25). As specific cases of Theorem 6, Corollary 2 above
demonstrates that privacy leakage of the weakest adversary has
an explicit relationship to the data correlation. That is, privacy
leakage of the weakest adversary depends on the summation
of all covariances connecting to xi, which represents the data
correlations. Next, the example shows the impacts of the
correlations and prior knowledge for tuples that follow a two-
dimensional Gaussian distribution.
Example 5 Consider a continuous-valued database x =
{x1, x2}; the expectation vector and variance matrix of x are
µ = [0, 0], Σ =
(
1 ρ12
ρ12 1
)
, respectively. ρ12 ∈ [−1, 1]
is the correlation coefficient of x1 and x2. From Corollary 2,
lA1,∅ = |1 + ρ12|M/λ. From the definition of PDP, we have
lA1,{2} = M/λ. If ρ12 > 0, then lA1,∅ > lA1,{2} . This means
that when the correlation is positive, a weak adversary has
more privacy leakage gain than a strong adversary. If ρ12 < 0,
then lA1,∅ < lA1,{2} . This means that when the correlation is
negative, the strong adversary has more privacy gain. These
results are also consistent with Examples 2 and 3, which are
discrete-valued data.
VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we conducted extensive experiments to
demonstrate the impact of prior knowledge and data corre-
lations on privacy leakage, and validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of our proposed algorithms for computing privacy
leakage.
A. Simulations Setting
We synthesized a database with 15 tuples1, in which the
average Pearson correlation coefficient changes from −0.8 to
1As described in Subsection III-A, a tuple refers to an attribute in the
database.
0.8. For the discrete-valued database, we generated a corre-
sponding WHG by assigning beta-distributed edges’ value. For
the continuous-valued database, we generated the covariance
matrix with covariance Cov(xi, xj) = 1, (i 6= j) for a
positive correlation, and Cov(xi, xj) = −1, (i 6= j) for
a negative correlation. We adjusted the principal diagonal
element Cov(xi, xi) to control the correlation coefficient.
In our experiments, we considered an adversary who can
infer information from a Laplace-mechanism-based privacy-
preserving sum query on the database. The noise scale of the
Laplace mechanism was set as λ = 1, and the domain size of
all tuples was set as 1. In all simulations, the prior knowledge
was measured by the number of tuples compromised by the
adversary, ranging from 14 to 0. Then, the privacy leakage the
adversary caused was calculated according to our analytical
results (Theorems 2, 5, 6) in Sections V and VI.
B. Simulation Results
For simplicity, let averCorr denote the average value of
the edges in the WHG, and averCoeff denote the average
value of the correlation coefficient in the MGD. averCorr and
averCoef represent the correlation degree for discrete-valued
and continuous-valued data, respectively. According to the
structure of the WHG, the layer number in a WHG represents
the number of unknown tuples for an adversary. Therefore,
a smaller layer number means a stronger adversary with
more prior knowledge and vice versa. Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(b)
shows the privacy leakage of discrete-valued data. Fig. 4(c)
and Fig. 4(d) shows the privacy leakage of continuous-valued
data.
1) Privacy Leakage vs Correlation: This subsection investi-
gates the impacts of data correlations on privacy leakage when
the prior knowledge is fixed.
Figs. 4(a)-4(d) show that the privacy leakage remains un-
changed with averCorr and averCoeff when the adversary has
the strongest prior knowledge (layer number=1, i.e., fewest
unknown tuples). This is because the uncertainty only occurs
from the attack object and no information gain can be obtained
from the correlations, which corresponds to our analysis in
Theorem 4.
Fig. 4(a) shows that the privacy leakage generally increases
with averCorr when averCorr is positive, for discrete-valued
data. The main reason is that with the increase in positive cor-
relations, tuples are more likely to show the similar trends and
the difference of the sum aggregation becomes much larger,
from which the adversary could obtain more information gain
of unknown tuples based on his prior knowledge (Theorem 3).
Fig. 4(b) shows the similar results when averCorr is negative.
Fig. 4(c) and Fig. 4(d) show similar results in the continuous
data.
2) Privacy Leakage vs Prior knowledge: This subsection
investigates the impacts of prior knowledge on privacy leakage
when the correlation is fixed.
Figs. 4(a) and 4(c) show that the privacy leakage increases
with the layer number for discrete data. That is, the pri-
vacy leakage decreases with the prior knowledge. This is
because, given the positive correlation, more unknown tuples
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Fig. 4. Privacy leakage vs. prior knowledge and data correlations. Figs. 4(a) and 4(b) show the results of the discrete-valued database. Figs. 4(c) and 4(d)
show the results of the continuous-valued database.
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Fig. 5. The comparison of the full-space-searching algorithm and the fast-searching algorithm in terms of privacy leakage and computation time. Figs. 5(a),
5(b) and 5(c) show the privacy leakage of both algorithms when the averCorr is 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8. Figs. 5(d) shows the average computation time of both
algorithms.
can cause a larger aggregation difference (Theorem 5) and
less uncertainty for adversaries from the privacy-preserving
results. In particular, the weakest adversary with the least
prior knowledge will obtain the largest privacy gain, and thus
leading to the highest privacy leakage (Corollary 1).
Fig. 4(b) shows that there are no monotone trends between
the privacy leakage and layer number when the data correla-
tion is negative for discrete-valued data because tuples with
mutually negative correlations will cancel each other out and
show no general trend in the aggregation result, which makes
it difficult for any adversary to achieve privacy gain. This
corresponds to our analysis that the privacy leakage computed
by the chain rule (Theorem 5) does not decrease with ICij,K′
when ICij,K′ < 0. Additionally, as we can see, the highest
privacy leakage is achieved when the layer number is 1 (the
strongest prior knowledge), which is consistent with Corollary
1.
Fig. 4(d) shows that privacy leakage decreases with the
amount of prior knowledge for continuous data because the
tuples with a mutually negative correlation will cancel each
other out in the aggregation, which reduces the uncertainty of
aggregation and makes it difficult for the adversary to infer
an individual tuple. Specifically, based on the multivariate
Gaussian model, more unknown tuples will lead to a stronger
“canceling” effect and less privacy leakage for a weaker
adversary.
3) Accuracy and Time Complexity: This subsection in-
vestigates the accuracy and efficiency of the fast-searching
algorithm compared to the full-space-searching algorithm. In
the simulation, we set the tuple number ranging from 1 to
15, and the average correlation from 0.2 to 0.8. Then, we
computed the corresponding maximal privacy leakage in each
case. Each simulation was run 30 times; both the average
privacy leakage and its variance were reported.
Figs. 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) compare the privacy leakage when
averCorr equals 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 respectively. The privacy
leakage computed with the fast-searching algorithm was gen-
erally larger than that of the full-space-searching algorithm and
led to overestimating the privacy since the search space of the
fast-searching algorithm is a subset of that of the full-space-
searching algorithm. However, when the average correlation
was stronger (e.g., averCorr=0.5, 0.8), the privacy leakage
computed with the fast-searching algorithm was very close
to the accurate privacy leakage computed with the full-space-
searching algorithm. However, the fast-searching algorithm
was far more efficient than the full-space-searching algorithm.
In particular, Fig. 5(d) shows the comparison result of the
average computational time for both algorithms. As we can
see, the fast-searching algorithm with the time complexity
of O(n4), required much less computational time than the
full-space-searching algorithm with the time complexity of
O(n42n−1).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a unified analysis to investigate the
impacts of general (positive, negative, and hybrid) data corre-
lations and arbitrary prior knowledge possessed by adversaries
on privacy leakage. For continuous data, we obtain a closed-
form expression of privacy leakage as a function of general
data correlation and prior knowledge by using multivariate
Gaussian distributions. For discrete data, a chain rule is derived
to represent the privacy leakage, by using a WHG that can
model the adversaries with arbitrary prior knowledge. All our
analytical results are obtained by strictly mathematical proofs
and hold for general linear queries. Numerical simulations
validate our theoretical analysis. Future work will extend our
analysis to nonlinear quires.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. For two adversaries Ai,K and its ancestor Ai,K′ , K′ =
K\{j}, by the law of total probability, we have
Pr(r|xi,xK′) =
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′)Pr(r|xi,xK).
Let lAi,K denote the value of the node (i,K). By the definition
of PDP, supxi,x′i log
Pr(r|xi,xK)
Pr(r|x′
i
,xK)
∈ [−lAi,K , lAi,K ]. Therefore
lAi,K′ = sup
xi,x′i,r
log
Pr(r|xi,xK′)
Pr(r|x′i,xK′)
= sup
xi,x′i,r
log
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′)Pr(r|xi,xK)∑
xj
Pr(xj |x′i,xK′)Pr(r|x′i,xK)
≤ sup
xi<x′i,r
∣∣∣∣∣lAi,K + log
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′)Pr(r|xi,xK)∑
xj
Pr(xj |x′i,xK′)Pr(r|xi,xK)
∣∣∣∣∣
= sup
xi<x′i
∣∣∣∣∣lAi,K + log
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′)e−xj/λ∑
xj
Pr(xj |x′i,xK′)e−xj/λ
∣∣∣∣∣ (26)
=
∣∣lAi,K + ICij,K′ ∣∣ . (27)
Eq. (26) uses the Laplace mechanism and Eq. (27) is the
definition of ICij,K′ .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
To prove Theorem 3, we propose the next lemma, which is
used to express the correlation by its conditional distribution.
Lemma 3. For a database x with two tuples x1 = {x1,1, x1,2},
and x2 = {x2,1, x2,2}. Let yi = E(x2|x1 = x1,i), i = 1, 2,
is the conditional expectation of x1. The joint distribution is
pij = Pr(x1 = x1,i, x2 = x2,j), pi· = pi1 + pi2, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Then, we have the next equivalent conditions of Pearson
correlation coefficient of x1 and x2, denoted as ρ12.
ρ12 > 0⇔ y1 < y2 ⇔ p11
p1·
>
p21
p2·
,
ρ12 < 0⇔ y1 > y2 ⇔ p11
p1·
<
p21
p2·
,
ρ12 = 0⇔ y1 = y2 ⇔ p11
p1·
=
p21
p2·
.
(28)
Proof. Based on the definition of the Pearson correlation
coefficient, the plus-minus sign of ρ12 is determined by its
covariance Cov(x1, x2). Using the properties of conditional
expectation, we have
E(x1x2) = E{E(x1x2|x1)} = x1,1y1p1· + x1,2y2p2·,
E(x2) = E{E(x2|x1)} = y1p1· + y2p2·.
Therefore, the covariance Cov(x1, x2) can be written as
Cov(x1, x2) = E(x1x2)− E(x1)E(x2)
= x1,1y1p1· + x1,2y2p2·
− (x1,1p1· + x1,2p2·) · (y1p1· + y2p2·)
= (x1,2 − x1,1)(y2 − y1).
The last equation uses the fact that p1·+p2· = 1. Note that the
plus-minus sign of ρ12 is equivalent to the sign of Cov(x1, x2),
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then we prove the left half of Eq. (28) by setting x1,2 > x1,1
as usual.
Next, we prove the right half. Based on the definition of the
conditional expectation of yi, we have
y2 − y1 =x2,1 p21
p2·
+ x2,2
p22
p2·
− x2,1 p11
p1·
− x2,2 p12
p1·
=(x2,2 − x2,1)
(
p11
p1·
− p21
p2·
)
. (29)
Eq. (29) uses the facts that p11p1· +
p12
p1·
= 1, and p21p2· +
p22
p2·
=
1. Set x2,2 > x2,1, then we complete the proof of the right
half.
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. (1) We prove that for any database x, the value of
IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) is bounded in [−1, 1].
Based on
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′) = 1, we have
min
k
e
−xj,k
λ ≤
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,xK′)e
−xj
λ ≤ max
k
e
−xj,k
λ . (30)
Eq. (30) holds for all xi. We replace xi with two different
values, xi,m and xi,n and have the following inequalities.
−LSj(f)
λ
≤ log
∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,m,xK′)e−xj/λ∑
xj
Pr(xj |xi,n,xK′)e−xj/λ ≤
LSj(f)
λ
.
Therefore, according to Eq. (13), the definition of
IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n), we have IRj,K′(xi,m, xi,n) ∈ [−1, 1].
(2) For a database x, two tuples among which are xi =
{xi,1, xi,2}, and xj = {xj,1, xj,2}. The conditional joint
distribution of xi and xj under xK′ is Pr(xi, xj |xK′). We
will prove that the correlations have a direct relation to
IRj,K′(x1,1, x1,2). According to Eq. (13),
IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2)
= log
∑
k=1,2 Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)e−xj,k/λ∑
k=1,2 Pr(xj,k|xi,2,xK′)e−xj,k/λ
/
LSj(f)
λ
Let
µ1 =
Pr(xj,1|xi,1,xK′)∑
k Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)
, ν1 =
Pr(xj,1|xi,2,xK′)∑
k Pr(xj,k|xi,2,xK′)
.
Obviously, µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1], and define the next function.
f(µ1, ν1) = log
µ1e
−xj,1/λ + (1− µ1)e−xj,2/λ
ν1e−xj,1/λ + (1− ν1)e−xj,2/λ , (31)
where the numerator and denominator are monotonically in-
creasing with respect to µ1, and µ2, respectively. Based on
these, we prove the three cases in Theorem 3 by using Lemma
3.
1) If ρij,K′ > 0, by Lemma 3, 1 ≥ µ1 > ν1 ≥ 0. Therefore
max f(µ1, ν1) = f(1, 0) = LSj(f)/λ,
min f(µ1, ν1) > f(a, a) = 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1).
So, f(µ1, ν1) ∈ (0, LSj(f)/λ], and IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈ (0, 1].
2) If ρij,K′ < 0, by Lemma 3, 0 ≤ µ1 < ν1 ≤ 1. Therefore
max f(µ1, ν1) < f(a, a) = 0, ∀a ∈ (0, 1),
min f(µ1, ν1) = f(0, 1) = −LSj(f)/λ.
So, f(µ1, ν1) ∈ [−LSj(f)/λ, 0), and IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈
[−1, 0).
3) If ρij,K′ = 0, by Lemma 3, µ1 = ν1 ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore,
f(µ1, ν1) ≡ 0, and IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) = 0.
(3) The conditions are the same as Case (2) except that
xj = {xj,1, · · · , xj,s}, s ≥ 3. Let ym = E(xj |xi,m,x′K),m =
1, 2. We claim that the left half of Lemma 3 holds without
presenting the similar proof.
Next, we prove Case (3). According to Eq. (13),
IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2)
= log
∑s
k=1 Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)e−xj,k/λ∑s
k=1 Pr(xj,k|xi,2,xK′)e−xj,k/λ
/
LSj(f)
λ
.
For k = 1, 2, · · · , s, let
µk =
Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)∑
k Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)
, νk =
Pr(xj,k|xi,2,xK′)∑
k Pr(xj,k|xi,2,xK′)
.
Then, we have
s∑
k=1
Pr(xj,k|xi,1,xK′)e−
xj,k
λ
=
s∑
k=1
µke
−
xj,k
λ ≈ 1−
s∑
k=1
µk
xj,k
λ
.
The last approximation is obtained by using ex ≈ 1 + x and
the fact
∑
k µk = 1. Then, we get
IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ≈ log 1−
∑
k µkxj,k/λ
1−∑k νkxj,k/λ
/
LSj(f)
λ
. (32)
With the additional condition λ > GS(f), then we have
xj,k/λ < 1, ∀k ∈ [s]. Combining
∑
k µk =
∑
k νk = 1, we
obtain
∑
k µkxj,k/λ < 1, and
∑
k νkxj,k/λ < 1. Based on
the extended expression of the left half of Lemma 3. We get
ρij,K′ > 0⇔ IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈ (0, 1],
ρij,K′ < 0⇔ IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) ∈ [−1, 0),
ρij,K′ = 0⇔ IRj,K′(xi,1, xi,2) = 0.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. According to the PDP for a continuous-valued
database, we compute the following
Pr(r|xi,xK)
Pr(r|x′i,xK)
=
∫
xU
Pr(xU |xi,xK)Pr(r|s)dxU∫
xU
Pr(xU |x′i,xK)Pr(r|s′)dxU
(33)
for any θ, r, |xi − x′i| ≤ M , where s′ = sU + x′i + sK. In
accordance with Lemma 1, set xu = x1|x2, where x1 = xU ,
x2 = {xi,xK}. Here, u is the number of variables in xU .
According to Lemma 1, xu follows u-dimensional Gaussian
distribution, with the density function
f(xu) = A exp(−1
2
(xU − µ1|2)⊤Σ−11|2(xU − µ1|2)), (34)
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where A = (2pi)−u/2
∣∣Σ1|2∣∣−1/2, µ1|2 = µ1+Σ12Σ−122 (x2−
µ2),Σ1|2 = Σ11 − Σ12Σ−122 Σ21. Because we adopt the
Laplace mechanism,
Pr(r|s) = 1
2λ
e−
|r−s|
λ , (35)
where s = sU + xi + sK denotes the sum of unknown tuples,
attack object tuple and known tuples. According to Lemma 1,
sU =
∑
k∈U xk follows the Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
sU ∼ N1(µ0, σ20) (36)
where µ0 = 1
⊤ · µ1|2, σ20 = 1⊤ ·Σ1|2 · 1.
By Eq. (21), σ20 is a constant independent of xi. By Eq. (20),
µ0 has relation to xi and xK. To analyze the influence of xi,
we should extract the item including xi. Therefore, we expand
µ0 and get
µ0 = µ00 + µ0ixi +
∑
k∈K
µ0kxk, (37)
where µ00 is a symbol to represent that all items have no
relation to xi, xk. Therefore, µ0 is only dependent on xi for
given xk, k ∈ K. Combining Eq. (36) and Eq. (37), the density
function of sU is
f(sU) =
1√
2piσ0
e
−
(sU−µ0)
2
2σ20
=
1√
2piσ0
e
−
(sU−µ00−µ0ixi−
∑
k∈K µ0kxk)
2
2σ2
0 . (38)
Let z = r− s, t = r− sK−µ00−
∑
k∈K µ0kxk− (1+µ0i)xi.
Substituting Eq. (35) and Eq. (38) into Eq. (33), we have∫
xU
Pr(xU |xi,xK)Pr(r|s)dxU =
∫
z
1√
2piσ0
e
− (t−z)
2
2σ20
1
2λ
e−
|z|
λ dz =
1
2λ
e
σ20
2λ2 G(
t
λ
;
σ0
λ
),
∫
xU
Pr(xU |x′i,xK)Pr(r|s)dxU =
∫
z
1√
2piσ0
e
− (t
′−z)2
2σ20
1
2λ
e−
|z|
λ dz =
1
2λ
e
σ20
2λ2 G(
t′
λ
;
σ0
λ
),
where t′ = r − sK − µ00 −
∑
k∈K µ0kxk − (1 + µ0i)x′i. So
log
Pr(r|xi,xK)
Pr(r|x′i,xK)
= logG(
t
λ
;
σ0
λ
)− logG( t
′
λ
;
σ0
λ
). (39)
By the mean value theorem and Lemma 2, we further have
log
Pr(r|xi,xK)
Pr(r|x′i,xK)
=
∂ logG(ξ)
∂(t/λ)
· ( t
λ
− t
′
λ
)
≤ |t/λ− t′/λ| = |1 + µ0i| · |xi − x′i|/λ.
Under the assumption |xi − x′i| ≤M , the privacy leakage is
lAi,K(θ) = |1 + µ0i|M/λ.
